The main clauses in (1) and (2) are understood as stating necessary conditions for achieving the goals expressed in the if-clauses ( 1) and in the rationale-clauses (2).
( 1) Anankastic conditionals a. If you want to go to Harlem, you must take the A trai n.
[ Sreb9> 2001] b. If you want to become mayor, you have to go to the pub regularly.
[ Kratzer 1981] c. If you want to be healthy, you should drink more tea. d. If you want to dance professionally, you need to practice every day.
(2)
Corresponding rationale clauses a. You must take the A train in order to go to Harlem.
[StrayhorniSreb9>]
b. You have to go to the pub regularly in order to become mayor. c. You have to drink tea to be healthy. d. You need to practice every day to dance professionally.
Sentences like (1), which have been called Anankastic (from the Greek word for necessity), have the outward form of conditionals. But their meanings differ from those of ordinary indicative conditionals in interesting respects-apart from the curious fact that the if-clause can be replaced by an infinitival rationale-clause. It is odd, for example, for a conditional sentence like (la) to imply (3). Why would a sentence of the form (4a) mean the same thing as one of the form (4b)?
If you do not take the A train, you will not go to Harlem. Ordinary indicative conditionals do not have this property. Compare the Anankastic conditional (5a) with the superficially similar (5b). This pair from Sreb0 (2001) is modeled after an observation by Hare (1963 ) . While (5a) is equivalent to (6a), (5b) does not mean the same thing as (6b). (5) a. If you want to be owner of America, you need to find the golden helmet.
b. If you want to be owner of America, you need to see a psychiatrist.
(6) a. If you do not fi nd the helmet, you cannot be the owner of America.
b. #lfyou do not see a psychiatrist, you cannot be the owner of America.
Several recent papers have addressed the problem of Anankastic conditionals, seeking to show how their meanings can be explained by the same theory that has been successful in characterizing the meanings of other conditionals (that of Kratzer 1981 Kratzer , 1991 . In this paper, I will discuss a set of facts that challenge these recent attempts. Alongside of the 'necessity conditionals' that have been the focus of attention, sits another class that might be cal led 'sufficiency conditionals'
with possibility modals in place of the necessity modals:
Sufficiency conditionals?
a. If you want to go to Harlem, you can take the A train.
b. If you want to become mayor, you could go to the pub regularly. c. If you want to be healthy, you could drink more tea.
d. If you want a decent grade, you can write a really good paper.
Like Anankastics, the sentences in (7) can be paraphrased with rationale clauses:
(8) a. You can take the A Train in order to go to Harlem. b. You could go to the pub regularly in order to become mayor.
c. You could drink tea to be healthy.
d. You can write a really good paper to get a decent grade.
In al l of these sentences, the "consequent" provides a sufficient condition for achieving the desire expressed in the if-clause/rationale clause. Both (7a) and (8a) assert that 'taking the A train is one of the ways you could get to Ha rlem '. And they both imply (9), suggesting an odd equivalence (10) parallel to (4), the equivalence that holds for Anankastics with universal modals.! Thus, these sentences seem to be in relevant respects the 'existential' versions of Anankastics. We might as well designate them 'Eparkastic Conditionals' (from the Greek for 'sufficiency').
My goals in this paper are to summari ze current approaches to the semantics of anankastics (section 3), then to show why examples like (7)- (8) challenge those approaches (section 4) . To foreshadow, I will try to show that the current theories, while making correct predictions about the meanings of (7)-(8), also predict wrongly that (11 ) could be true in a world much like the real one.
(11) #If you want to go to Harlem, you can ki ss Pedro Martinez.
I will then suggest a way to address the problem (section 5) . The idea is based on the observation that rationale clauses appear in non-modal environments (12a), where they are understood as expressing something about the goal that is related to an agent's action. Thus (12b) is nonsensical , if Varitek is rational.
(12) a. Varitek took the A Train to go to Harlem. b. #Varitek kissed Pedro Martinez to go to Harlem.
Appropriating an idea of von Fintel & Iatridou (2004) , I'll suggest that anankastic (and eparkastic) sentences embed (sometimes elliptical) purposive rationale clauses, but in the scope of the modal operator (as in 13). I will argue that if this is correct, the deviance of (11 ) follows from the deviance of (12b). Kratzer's (198 1, 1991) theory of modals and conditionals in terms of restricted quantification over possible worlds.
Under Kratzer's theory, modal sentences are interpreted with respect to two contextual parameters, each one a set of propositi ons (typically implicit) in the conversational background. The first set of propositions is a modal base, which formally is given by a function f that assigns to the world of evaluation w the setf(w), propositions that express relevant facts about w and jointly determine the worlds that the modal operator quantifies over. These could be propositions that are known to hold in the evaluation world, for instance, giving an epistemic modal base, or propositions that express relevant facts about the evaluation world, giving what Kratzer calls a circumstantial modal base. (The sentences considered in this paper chiefly involve modals restricted by circumstantial bases.)
The second contextual parameter is an ordering source-a set of propositions that serves to order the worlds described by the modal base according to how closely they conform to a set of ideals in the conversational background. The orderi ng source is modeled as the set of propositions g(w),
which could express what the laws of w demand (a deontic orderi ng source), or what our desires, aims, or goals are in w (a bouletic ordering). These propositions partition the worlds in the modal base, determining a strict partial order on them ( l 4-version from von Fintel and Iatridou 2005) . And based on that ordering, it is possible to select a subset of modal base worlds that are the best possible ones according to the ideals expressed in the ordering source (15).
(14)
For any set of propositions P, we define a strict partial order <p : where J+-(w) = .f(w) Up.
Now, in addition to the modal base propositions (17a) , which restrict the modal in terms of certain facts that are true in the evaluation world, the if-clause in (18) expresses a hypothetical fact about the worlds that are quantified over (but is not necessarily true in the evaluation world), namely that it 's two o'clock. Among these further restricted worlds, there are no worlds that are 'ideal ' according to the ordering source (17b) -since (17b(i) is fal se in these worlds. But there remains a partition between worlds that are "as close as possible" to the ideal -those in which I pay a fine-and worlds that are farther from the ideal (in which neither (l7b(i» nor (17b(ii) holds). Consider the sentence (2 1), and suppose that all the propositions in (22a) and (22b) are true.
(2 1) You must go to the pub regularly. (22) a. The world is such that you will become mayor only if you go to the pub regularly. b. i.
You want to become mayor.
11.
You want not to go to the pub regularly.
Kratzer (198 1) described this as " the horrible story of someone who wants something but rejects the necessary means leading to the fulfillment of her . desires", and observed that her doubly relative theory of modals correctly predicts (2 1) to be interpreted as a false sentence under the circumstances. But Kratzer's theory makes a wrong prediction about the meanings of Anankastic sentences: (23) is predicted to be fal se as well, wrongly.
(23) I f you want to become mayor, you have to go to the pub regularly.
Kratzer's theory adds the if-clause-the proposition that you want to become mayor-to the factual modal base (2 1a). If the ordering source is picking out the goals that you have in the actual world, it includes both of the desires expressed in (2 1b). But since there is no way for any of the modal base worlds to satisfy both propositions in the ordering source simultaneously, worlds in which one or the other goal is met are tied fo r first place. That is, (24) is wrong as a description of the meaning of (23).
( 24) I n aU of the best possible worlds (according to the two propositions in (2 1 b» among those jointly descri b ed by (21a) and the proposition that you want to become mayor, you go to the pub regularly.
Stebrj) 's Insight: If-Clauses Change the Ordering Source
Sreb!D (2001) was the fi rst to address Kratzer's Anankastic problem. His suggestion was that material from the if clause can be added to the ordering source, rather than adding the whole if-clause to the modal base. Specifically, he proposed that the complement of want can be treated as a hypothetical ideal, rather than the whole if clause being treated as a hypothetical fact.
Stebrj) 's Problem, and a Non-Compositional Fix
But SrebJlj's suggestion doesn't solve Kratzer's problem, as was pointed out by von Fintel & Iatridou (2004) and Penka et al . (2004) . Merely adding a proposition to the ordering source won 't handle incompatible goals: we'd still end up with mayor-worlds and pub-worlds tied for first place. Von Fintel & Iatridou (2004; henceforth vF&I) propose a way to handle the non compositionality problem while still achieving the same net result as Penka et al . (namely to treat the if-clause goal as a hypothetical fact) . Specifically, vF&I capitalize on SrebJlj's observation that Anankastics can be paraphrased using infi nitival rationale clauses (26a), and propose that teleological modals select the rationale clause as an argument (26b,c). 2 This infinitival to-clause expresses what vF&I call the designated goal-a goal that effectively overrides competing goals in the ordering source, in virtue of restricting the modal base worlds to just those where the goal is achieved. (26) a. To become mayor, you have to (/shoul cf ) go to the pub regularly. b.
[SHOULD fe w) g(w) to become mayor] [you go to the pub regularly] c. (26b) is true in w iff all the g(w)-best worlds inf(w) where you become mayor are worlds where you go to the pub regularly.
For anankastics with if-clauses, vF&I suggest that the infiniti val is still present, but elliptical :
(27) If you want to become mayor, you should go to the pub (to become mayor
q(w') = 1.
The if-clause can now restrict the modal base in the standard way; its contribution to the truth conditions will be minimal since the work was already done by the to clause. 4 And, vF&I argue, the to-clause does the job compositionally. s True iff all the g(w)-best worlds in f(w) where you both want to go to Harlem and you �o to Harlem are such that you kiss RvN.
In the actual world w, both the g(w) goals stated in (3 1) are attainable as long as you get on the A train. If so, unlike Kratzer's mayor scenario, the set of g(w)-best worlds are such that both propositions hold. Hence the truth conditions stated in (34) are met. If this is the structure of an anankastic, competing goals held in the actuaL worLd (such as 'not going to the pub') would be irrelevant for the interpretation of (38) .
The ordering source for the embedded modal is supplied not by a function of the utterance world, but by the goal stated in the if-clause that restricts the higher modal . For exactl y the same reason, non-competing goals held in the actual world would be irrelevant for the interpretation of (39). All of the proposals currently on the table fail to predict this. Huitink would have the orderi ng source consist solely of the salient goal of getting to Harlem; the designated goal anal ysis of vF&I would promote that goal by adding the proposition that you get to Harlem to the modal base; their nested modals analysis would yield an ordering source (for the lower modal) consisting of just the proposition that you get to Harlem. In all of these cases, it's easy to satisfy the truth conditions of (40).
What Huitink needs to say:
'IfWANf P. CAN q ' is true in w iff 3w' E MAX { p } (n.f(w» : q(w') = 1.
-+ (40) is true in w iff at least one of the best (=Harlem) worlds in.f(w) is such that you ki ss Pedro Martinez.
(42)
What vF&I need to say (similarly, Penka et al.) :
' (lfwant p) To p. CAN q ' is true in w iff 3w'EMAXg(wln.f(w)Up): q(w')= l.
-+ (40) is true in w iff at least one of the g(w)-best get-to-Harlem worlds in.f(w) is such that you kiss Pedro Martinez.
What the vF&I nested modals analysis would need to say : '<MuST> if want p. CAN q ' is true in w iff Vw' E n.f( w)Up:
[3w"EMAXg(w.)(n.f( w'» : q(w ") = 1]. -+ (40) is true in w iff for al l of the epistemicaJly accessible worlds w' such that your goal is to get to Harlem, at least one of the g(w' )-best (=Harlem) worlds is such that you kiss Pedro Martinez.
Under those conditions, (40) is surely true; it hard to imagine a reason why there wouldn 't be an accessible world in which your goal of getting to Harlem is reached and you also kiss Pedro Martinez, given that he 's on the very trai n that takes you where you want to go.
Note that (44a, b) are felici tous under the same circumstances-if it the case (and it is) that both the A and the C trains will take you to Harlem.
(44) a. If you want to get to Harlem, you can take the A trai n.
b. You can take the A train in order to get to Harlem.
These sentences are understood to mean taking the A train is one way to achieve the goal of getting to Harlem-that that action constitutes a sufficient condition (together with facts in the circumstantial modal base) for achieving the goal . This observation is important, since it shows that one cannot simply stipulate that the anankastic reading is limited to modal operators with universal force. Existentials can in principle get 'anankastic-like' (eparkastic) readings.
What is needed is a theory that predicts (44) to be true while also predicti ng the Pedro Ma rtinez sentence (40) to be fal se.
A Suggestion
I would like to suggest an approach to the problem of sufficiency conditionals that appropriates a core part of vF&I 's 'designated goal ' theory, but rejects one of its important detai ls. Specifically, we might accept vF&I 's insight that infinitival to clauses are al ways what's responsible for inducing the relevant readi ng-while dispensing with their assumption that it restricts a modal operator. After al l, infi nitival to-clauses can appear with ordinary VPs that aren 't in the scope of a modal . And when they do, they still typically express something about the goal s of the VP's agent.
Rationale Clauses in Non-Modal Environments
Infi niti val to-clauses can appear in the environment of non-modal main clauses, where they nevertheless have a teleological interpretation:
(45)
Varitek took the A train to get to Harlem.
(46)
Menino went to the pub regularly to become mayor.
(47)
Satsuki 's father drank green tea in order to remain healthy. # Brad was bleeding in order to prove a point.
Thus, ordinary agentive VPs are understood teleological ly: they describe goal directed actions. Rationale clauses serve to describe the goals that direct those actions.
I think that what we should learn from such sentences is that a crucial component of anankastic readings-specifically, the expression of an agent's goal in undertaking an action-is supplied internal to the VP. independent of an embedding modal verb.
Here is a way of implementing the idea compositionally. This method assumes that both VPS and rationale clauses denote predicates of events, and compose by Predicate Modification. Alternative assumptions could undoubtedly be made (e.g. that the verb takes the rati onale clause as an argument, or that the rationale clause takes the VP as its argument): I don't think anything I have to say about these VPs hinges on any of these choices. According to (5Ia), the VP in (45) just denotes the predicate that is true of any A train-taking event in w whose agent is Varitek.
As for the adjunct's denotation (SIb), there are two things to note. First, it is a more or less standard (modulo the difference noted in the next paragraph) description of a desire modeled after Hintikka's semantics for propositional attitudes (Hintikka 1969, von Fintel & Heim 2(05) . The facts above (45-50), I think, lead us to the conclusion that to-clauses, at least in this environment, are modal statements and not bare propositions. Assuming that all infinitival to adjuncts receive a unified treatment, this observation is incompatible with the claim (made, for example, by vF&I) that an infi nitival clause [to p] can serve to add the proposition that p (compositionally) to the modal base of a modal operator. Rather, adding [to p] to a modal base would be equivalent to adding the proposition [ . . . want that pV Second, the goal described by a rati onale clause is stated relative to the lambda-abstracted event, on a par with the way modal accessibility is defined in relation to an evaluation world. This requires that we take event and world variables to be of the same essential type. Goals can be relevant to a possible world w, for instance the goals expressed by propositions that are assigned to w by the ordering source of a modal verb. The goals described in (S Ib) as being "relevant to e", where e is an agentive event, are simply the goals held by the agent of e that are relevant to carrying out the action that describes e. I don't think this is adding anything significant beyond what must be implicitly assumed about the notion agentivity.
Closure over the conjunction of (5Ia) and (SIb) yields true (given an assignment a and world w) iff Varitek is the agent of an A-train-taking event e in w whose goal is that he goes to Harlem . s
Te leological VPs and Ne cessity Conditionals
If ordinary agentive VPs have teleological meanings, then the teleological component of an Anankastic Conditional 's meaning doesn't need to be specified by an argument of the modal. 9 In (52a), the rationale clause modifies the VP, and is within the scope of the modal : (52) a. HA VE-TO j(w) g(w) [you take the A train in order to get to Harlem] b. True iff, in al l of the g(w)-best worlds in j(w), you are the agent of an A -train-taking event e whose goal is that you go to Harlem.
When J( w) is a circumstantial modal base and g(w) is a bouletic ordering source that picks out your goals in w, the interpretation of (52a) will be anankastic. The goal expressed by the rationale-:elause-because it is in the scope of the modal is a goal held i n worlds quantified over by the modal. But since the modal base is circumstantial, relevant facts about w will be true of the quantified-over worlds as well, including (presumably; see note 12) the fact that your goal is to go to Harlem; Let's assume, following vF&I, that in conditionals with an if clause and no overt rationale clause, the if clause restricts the modal base and the rationale clause is elliptical : (53) a. If you want to go to Harlem, HAVE-TO f(w) g(w) [you take the A train (in order to go there)]
b. True iff, in al l of the g(w)-best worlds inf(w) where you want to go to Harlem, you are the agent of an A-train-taking event e whose goal is that you go there.
Truth conditions like these still make wrong predictions in scenarios with additional goals (like Kratzer's mayor scenario, or Huitink's Ruud scenario)-if the ordering source g(w) necessarily picks out all of your goals in w, the world of evaluation. For instance, if one of your goals in w is 'that you don 't take the A train ', then it won't be the case that all of the g(w)-best worlds are A-train worlds.
So the sentence corresponding to (53) would be predicted, wrongly, to be false in that scenario. 10 To make the ri ght predictions then, the VP-level analysis for the to-clause in anankastic sentences still requires a supplementary assumption to block interfering goals from the ordering source. As far as I can see, there are two viable proposals to choose from: Huitink's salient goals, and vF&I 's nested modals. l1 It would be quite straightforward to supplement the VP-level analysis (52, 53) with Huitink's proposal . We would only need to assume that it is (ultimately) the VP adjoined rationale clause-not the if-clause-that makes the goal salient. That would reduce g(w) to the single proposition that you go to Harlem. The nested modals idea would work equally well. Then, for example, (53 a) would be modified to (54a), yielding the truth conditions stated in (54b): you want is to go to Ha rlem: all the w'-best worlds that are circumstantially accessible from w' are such that you are the agent of an A-train-taking event e whose goal is that you go there.
That seems to get the truth conditions of Anankastics right. 12
To sum up what I think I've shown so far in this section, to-clauses can appear as VP-adjuncts in non-modal environments. The ri ght semantics for to clauses treats them as modal propositions describi ng goals; consequently, the teleological component of anankastics comes from the scope of the modal rather than its restriction. I concluded with the observation that the goal nevertheless needs to appear in the modal restriction. This observation makes my VP-Ievel suggestion seem superfluous. In the next subsection I'll argue that it's necessary after all, since it offers a way around the problem of kissing Pedro Ma rtinez.
The Te leological Na ture oj VPs Solves the 'SUfficiency Conditional' Problem
What about the Pedro Martinez problem? The claim that modal verbs take teleological ly interpreted VPs allows a solution for it. Recall that the problem was to predict (44) to be true and (40) to be fal se:
If you want to get to Harlem, you can take the A train.
(40) #If you want to get to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez.
Suppose, as argued in the previous subsection, that the goal expressed in the rationale-clause projects up to the ordering source for the modal . Then, if the possibility modal contains an elliptical to-clause in its scope, interpreted as a description of the goal of the agentive VP, exactly these predictions are made: It is plain that the deviance of (40) results from the deviance of (57), which remains deviant when embedded under can: Note, however, that in Pedro Ma rtinez sentences, it is not the if-clause that is superfluous-it is the main clause. In an 'existential anankastic' (or eparkastic) the if-clause expresses the desired goal. What makes (40) fal se, intuiti vely, is that the action descri be by the main clause (kissing Pedro) is irrelevant for achieving the goal . A fel ici ty condition demanding non-superfluous if-clauses would suffice for other non-anankastic existential conditionals. Pedro sentences seem to fall under a different generalization. Moreover, Huitink's fel icity condition doesn't explai n why the rationale-clause paraphrase (40b) is likewise fal se, since that is not a condi tional . There too, the main clause seems responsible. (40) b. # In order to go to Harlem, you can kiss Pedro Martinez. Kai von Fintel (p.c.) has pointed out a different problem , one which leads to the concl usion that infinitival to-clauses, at least sometimes, are not parsed as VP modifiers in the scope of modals. Consider the two sentences of (59). These both receive anankastic interpretati ons: they express a necessary condition (knowing French) for achieving an outcome (working in the public schools). Unlike the sentences considered throughout this paper, however, the VP of the main clause is not agentive: it describes the (non-volitional) state of knowing French. Consequently, it cannot be modified by a purposive to-clause:
No n-Agentive VPs
(60) #Jean knows French in order to get a job in the public schools.
If anankastic readings were always derived in the manner suggested in section 5, then the VPs in (59) would have to be in all relevant respects identical to (60)
predicting both (59a-b) to be deviant as well, wrongly. That is, by the logic of section 5, the deviance of (60) What about the interpretations of (59a, b) ? With regard to the anankastic conditional (59a) , the two options I suggested at the end of section 5.2 (or the third one that I suggested in note 12) allow for a straightforward interpretation without a VP-Ievel to-clause. As for (59b), the only tenable attachment site for the to-clause is evidently at the level of the modal verb, raising the obvious question whether the modal semantics I gave for to-clauses in section 5. 1 will work (or whether Bech 1957 was right in claiming that anankastic to-clauses differ from rationale clauses). As far as I can see, my modal version of to-clauses (51b) works well for (59b), if the modal proposition is added to the modal base (indirectly providing a goal for the ordering source). Roughly, the sentence would be true in w iff, in all of the g(w)-best worlds among those in which the relevant goal is that you work in the public schools, you know French. who by sharing their work in progress (which I got to via Kai's weblog) made it possible for an onlooker like me to benefit from and take part in the public discussion they were having. In addition, Kai von Finte!, lanneke Huitink, Alan Bale, Yosef Grodzinsky, and Martin Hackl provided extremely helpful comments and criticisms at various stages. I also wish to thank the other participants at the SALT conference. This work was supported by the Fonds Quebecois de la Recherche sur la Societe et la Culture, award # 9944 0. IActuall y, this is not quite right. It is more accurate to say that (lOa) is equivalent to the statement "If q and other relevant facts about the world hold, then p". See section 2 for a more thorough description and justification of this qualification. I thank Kai von Fintel (p.c.) for calling this to my attention.
2 As vF&1 hint in their paper, it would work just as well to treat the to-clause as an adjunct that restricts the modal base rather than an extra argument of the modal. 3vF&1 argue for a distinction between have to/must, on the one hand, and ought to/should on the other. For have to/must, they give an interesting argument that the ordering source effectively play s no role-i .e. th e proposition in the scope of want in the if-clause is required to hold in all the worlds quantified over by the modal, regardless of any other desires, etc. that are held in the evaluation world. 4Von Stechow et al. (2005) independently propose this idea but take it in a diffe rent directi on: they propose the to-clause restricts the modal base of something like a counterfactual conditional . For discussion see Huitink (2005b) . SBut see section 5.1 for an argument that this wouldn't actually be compositi onal . 6Given the distinction mentioned in note 3, Huitink's observation applies just to anankastics with ought/should under their theory. 7Perhap s it is not obvious that we want a unified treatment for to-adjuncts, however. See Bech (1957) for an argument that to-clauses come in two flavors. I will proceed under the assumpti on that a unified treatment is desirable, if possible. In section 6.2 I give a sketch of an argument that it is.
81 assume the open event argument is exi stentially closed and that modal verbs compose with an intensional abstraction over the VP's denotation. 90r, more generally, by an additional restriction on the modal base. See note 2. 101 am grateful to Kai von Fintel for noticing thi s and pointing it out to me. liThe 'designated goal' fi x advocated by vF&I -adding the bare proposition that you go to Harlem to the modal base-isn't a viable option if the elliptical to phrase is actually a modal statement, as I argued in the previous subsection . 121 believe there might actually be a third, more parsimonious opti on for eliminating the problem of interfe ring goal s, which may not have been brought up so far. Let's accept that every proposition p in an ordering source g(w) has a corresponding proposition in a circumstantial modal base ordered by g(w) : e:g. that "the laws ofw demand that p", "One of Sue 's goals in w is that p", etc. (Such descriptions of the propositions in the ordering source surely count as 'relevant facts about w. ') Let' s assume fu rther that an if-c lause like "if you want p" can add to the modal base the hypothetical propositi on that 'what you want in w is that p '.
Since the propositions in a circumstantial modal base must be consistent, adding such a proposition entails that the modal base doesn't contain descriptions of an y
